Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens by Bartholet, Elizabeth
 
Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII: United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title
VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
70 Calif. L. Rev. 1201 (1982).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss5
/2/
Accessed February 16, 2015 6:05:05 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13031850
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACalifornia Law Review
Volume 70|Issue 5 Article 2
September 1982
Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII:
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens
Elizabeth Bartholet
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the California Law Review at Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Law Review by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Bartholet,Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 Cal. L.
Rev. 1201 (1982).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss5/2Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under
Title VII:  United States Postal




The Supreme Court will hear a case this Term involving the ques-
tion of how intentional discrimination in employment  can be proven.
The case-United  States  Postal  Service Board  of Governors  v. Aikens 1-
involves  a claim brought  under title  VII of the  Civil  Rights  Act  of
1964.2  Aikens charged  the Postal Service with racial discrimination in
denying him  promotion  to various  managerial-level  jobs.  The  D.C.
Circuit ruled that he could make out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing that he possessed all known qualifications for the pro-
motions, and had been passed over in favor of white candidates  The
United  States  Department  of Justice, representing  the Postal  Service,
has  asked  the  Court  to rule  that  plaintiffs  prima  facie  proof must
demonstrate a "probability"  of discrimination.4  In this case, where the
plaintiff relied  on comparative  qualifications to show intent, the Gov-
ernment says that to make out this probability, plaintiff would have to
provide  evidence that he is more qualfed than the candidates chosen,
in terms of whatever tangible and intangible factors may be taken into
t  Assistant  Professor  of Law,  Harvard University.  B.A.  1962,  Radcliffe College;  LL.B.
1965,  Harvard Law School.
The author served from  1968 to  1972 as a staff attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense  and
Educational  Fund,  Inc., which is  co-counsel for respondent Aikens in the case discussed herein.
She has since that time continued to consult with the Legal Defense Fund on various of its cases.
1.  102  S.  Ct.  1707  (1982)  (No. 81-1044), granting cert. to  Aikens v. United  States  Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors,  665  F.2d  1057 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2.  Pub. L. No. 88-352,  §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241,  253-66  (1964)  (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.  §§ 2000e  to  2000e-17  (1976  & Supp.  IV  1980)).  Title VII was  made  applicable  to the
federal government in 1972.  Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, §  11,  Pub. L. No. 92-
261,  86 Stat.  103,  111  (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16  (1976  & Supp. IV 1980)).
3.  Aikens v. United  States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 665  F.2d  1057 (D.C. Cir.  1981),
cert.  granted, 102 S.  Ct. 1707 (1982).  An earlier decision by the D.C. Circuit in this case, 642 F.2d
514 (D.C. Cir. 1980), was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, 453 U.S. 902 (1981), for
reconsideration  in light of Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.  Burdine, 450 U.S. 248  (1981).
4.  Brief for Petitioner at  10,  19  n.14, Aikens.
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account in the Postal Service's  promotional decisionmaking  system.-
The definition of the requirements of plaintiffs' prima facie case is
of tremendous practical significance in a title VII case.  If plaintiffs fail
to make out a prima facie case, judgment must be entered against them
upon  defendant's motion for judgment at the close of plaintiff's  case.
(Since  most title VII  cases are tried  without  a jury,6 the  court would
ordinarily dismiss the case, on the merits, pursuant to rule 41(b) of the
Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure.)  However, if plaintiffs  succeed  in
making  out a prima  facie  case, judgment must be  entered for  them,
unless  the defendant  produces  satisfactory rebuttal evidence.  Thus in
an intentional  discrimination case, plaintiffs'  prima facie proof is said
to create a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption"  of discrimina-
tion.7  This has the effect of forcing the defendant  employer to produce
evidence to rebut the presumption of discrimination at the risk of los-
ing the case.
The key issue posed  by Aikens relates  to the point at which  this
burden of production should be placed on the employer.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit held, in effect, that plaintiff must show in his initial case only what
he  could, with reasonable  effort,  be expected  to learn  prior to trial-
namely,  that  he  possessed  all  known  qualifications.  This  showing
would place the burden of production  on the employer to provide evi-
dence  as  to why it selected whites  over an apparently  qualified  black
candidate-evidence  that would presumably include information as to
how the employer's discretionary promotional system measured  quali-
fications.  The Government argues that since in an intentional discrimi-
nation case plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue
of illicit intent, plaintiff must demonstrate  a probability of illicit intent
in his initial proof. No burden of production  should be placed on the
defendant until such a probability is made out.
The manner in which this issue is resolved will significantly affect
the substantive meaning of the ban on intentional  discrimination con-
tained in title VII and other job discrimination legislation.  This is be-
cause  of the  nature  of intentional  discrimination  in  today's  world.
Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenomenon.  The
very existence of title VII, with its ban on discrimination, and its provi-
5.  Id  at 10, 23, 24 n.18.  The Government says that a probability of discrimination can also
be proved by a showing that the employer's decision was economically  irrational, or by statistical
evidence that an employer has consistently hired a disproportionately  small number of minorities,
or by anecdotal evidence  of racial prejudice.  Id  at  11.
6.  Title VII has been interpreted  not to provide  a right to jury trial even when back pay
claims are involved.  See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d  1091,  1094 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1975)  (restitu-
tion for back pay is an equitable and not a legal remedy); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,  515 F.2d
301,  308  (6th Cir.  1975), vacated  on other  grounds and  remanded, 431  U.S. 951  (1977).
7.  Texas Dep't of Community  Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,  254 n.7  (1981).
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sions guaranteeing  victims  the right to damages, injunctive  relief, and
attorneys'  fees, has meant the elimination of most such discrimination
by most employers.  It is intentional discrimination in its covert, hidden
form that now poses the real problem.  Evidence of illicit intent may be
extremely  difficult  to obtain, whether  the responsible  individuals  are
conscious of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether
they are expressing unconscious bias through some discretionary deci-
sionmaking  process.  Plaintiffs'  chances  of proving  illicit intent  will,
therefore, turn to a great degree on judicial rulings as to what kind of
evidence  of such  intent plaintiffs  are required  to produce  at various
stages  of the trial process,  and with what kind of assistance  from the
employer.
The position  that the  Government  is taking  in  the Aikens  case
would, if accepted by the Supreme  Court, shape the  "disparate treat-
ment"  doctrine, which  defines the standards by which intentional dis-
crimination  is proven  under  title VII, in  a way that  would  make  it
extremely  difficult for plaintiffs to uncover evidence of illicit intent in
most cases.  And in cases where the challenged decisionmaking  system
includes  elements of subjectivity and discretion, the Government's pro-
posed standard may make it nearly impossible to prove such intent.
The disparate treatment doctrine is, of course, only one of the two
main doctrines that have been developed to interpret and enforce title
VII.  The  other  is  the  "disparate  impact"  doctrine,  which  governs
unintentional discrimination, and holds that certain employer practices
having  an  adverse impact  on minorities  are unlawful  unless  the  em-
ployer can prove that they are "job-related."9  The impact doctrine has
been an enormously powerful weapon for plaintiffs, because it removes
any necessity to prove illicit motive on the employer's part, and because
the burden of proof placed on the employer to show job-relatedness has
turned out to be very difficult to satisfy.10
However, the disparate treatment doctrine remains of great impor-
tance.  Courts generally apply disparate treatment  analysis to cases  of
individual, rather than class-directed, discrimination.  And they gener-
ally apply disparate treatment analysis to employment decisionmaking
systems that rely on discretion and subjective judgment; the courts are
thus far divided on the issue of whether the impact doctrine should be
8. The Government's  standard would  thus further  the dichotomy  between judicial treat-
ment of "upper  level" as compared  with "lower  level" jobs-a dichotomy  that is  discussed and
criticized in Bartholet, Title VII'sApplication to Jobs in High Places,  95 HARV.  L. REv. 945 (1982)
(courts have effectively immunized society's more desirable jobs from the doctrines that have been
routinely  applied to blue collar jobs in the last fifteen years).
9.  The leading Supreme Court case adopting this doctrine is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
10.  See Bartholet, supra note 8,  at 950-55.
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applied to require employers  to provide convincing proof of job-relat-
edness with respect to such systems."  Moreover, the impact doctrine's
future is somewhat  uncertain. Prominent  officials in the Reagan  Ad-
ministration have made clear their concern about the use of the impact
doctrine.' 2  And the  Supreme  Court has  shown itself reluctant to  ex-
pand the impact doctrine's  applicability.'3  In the future, therefore, dis-
parate  treatment  analysis  may  be  all  that  is  available  to  plaintiffs
charging job discrimination  in a wide variety of contexts.
Moreover, theprinci.ole that the Government  is proposing in Aik-
ens would, if accepted by the Court, significantly undermine the dispa-
rate impact doctrine as well  as the disparate treatment doctrine.  This
principle  is that plaintiffs  must  provide,  as part  of their  prima  facie
case, evidence demonstrating probability as to the ultimate fact at issue.
In an impact case, the ultimate fact at issue is the existence of unjusti-
fied adverse  impact on. minorities.  The Government's principle would
seem logically to lead to a requirement that plaintiffs produce evidence
in their prima facie case that challenged systems  are not job-related.14
The radical changes  that have been wrought  by the  disparate impact
doctrine are largely attributable to the fact that it has placed on defend-
ants the burden of production  and persuasion  on the job-relatedness
issue.  It has generally been assumed that if plaintiffs had to prove the
absence of  job-relatedness  in order to prevail, they would almost never
be able to do so.  The Government's principle would, therefore, if car-
ried  to  its  logical  extreme,  mean  the  effective  death  of  the  impact
doctrine.
The issue presented by the  Government's  position in Aikens  will
not necessarily be resolved in this case.  Aikens'  attorneys have  filed a
brief arguing that plaintiff introduced  extensive  evidence that he was,
in fact,  at least  as  qualified  as the whites chosen, together with  other
11.  Id.  at  973-78,  987.
12.  See N.Y. Times, Dec.  14,  1981,  at 21,  col.  I (Attorney General William  French Smith);
id.,  Nov.  18,  1981,  at  21,  col.  3  (Clarence  Pendleton,  Chairman,  United  States  Civil  Rights
Comm'n); id, Nov.  16,  1981,  at  1, col. 3 (Assistant Attorney  General  for  Civil Rights William
Bradford Reynolds).
13.  See, e.g.,  General  Bldg.  Contractors  Ass'n  v.  Pennsylvania,  102  S.  Ct.  3141,  3146-50
(1982)  (42 U.S.C. §  1981 requires proof of intent); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,  102 S.  Ct.
1534 (1982)  (seniority plans adopted after title VII became effective are not subject to challenge
under disparate impact standard).
14.  Distinctions could, of course, be drawn.  The defendant has the burden of persuasion, as
well as production, on the job-relatedness issue under the Griggs decision.  In an intent case, the
plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion  on the issue of intent.  So long as Griggs is consid-
ered to be good law on the burden of persuasion issue, there are strong arguments for leaving the
burden of production on that issue on defendant also.  But acceptance of the Government's princi-
ple that it is wrong  to shift the burden of production  in a disparate treatment  case might raise
questions as to the propriety  of shifting the burden of persuasion  in an impact case.
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evidence indicating intentional discrimination." 5  The Court could well
decide that the Government's proposed  standard was in fact met, or it
could dispose of the case in some other way.16  But the issue presented
is  one that will recur,  as  cases  involving  middle  and upper level job
advancement  are brought to court in increasing numbers.7
The purpose of this Article is to discuss some of the considerations
that should be weighed in resolving  this issue, as  well as to point out
what is at stake in terms of the substantive norms of title VII.
I
BURDENS  OF  PRODUCTION  AND  PERSUASION  UNDER  THE
DISPARATE  TREATMENT DOCTRINE
The disparate treatment doctrine was recently clarified and refined
by  a  unanimous  Supreme  Court  in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v.  Burdine. 18  Burdine, like previous  disparate  treatment cases,
envisions three stages of proof. At the first stage plaintiffs must present
a prima facie case of discrimination.  In some cases plaintiffs may rely
in whole  or in part on  evidence  of blatant  acts  of discrimination  to
show  the  employer's  bad  faith.  Usually,  however,  they will  rely  in
whole or in part on circumstantial  evidence, which may simply consist
of a showing  that the employer has preferred whites  over blacks with
comparable  objective  qualifications. 19  What  kind  of evidence  is  re-
quired will depend on the circumstances, but the evidence must at least
eliminate  "the most common  non-discriminatory reasons"  for the em-
ployer's action.2"  Burdine notes that  "an appropriate  model"'"  is the
15.  See Brief for the  Respondent at 20-31, Aikens.
16.  See infra note 33.
17.  Thus versions of the Aikens  issue may have been presented in Powell v. Syracuse Univ.,
580 F.2d  1150,  1155  (2d Cir.  1978), and in Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726,  730 (7th Cir.  1979).
Both held that candidates  for university  level faculty positions  need  only show,  to make out  a
prima facie  case, that they meet  the basic  qualifications for  the positions.  It is for  defendant to
make the initial showing of comparative  qualifications in rebuttal.  But see Agarwal v. Arthur G.
McKee  & Co.,  16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 8301, at 5574 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 644 F.2d  803
(9th  Cir.  1981); Presseisen  v. Swarthmore  College,  442  F. Supp.  593,  616  (E.D. Pa.  1977),  a  f'd
mem.,  582 F.2d  1275 (3d Cir.  1978).
18.  450 U.S.  248 (1981).
19.  See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,  EMPLOYMENT  DIsCRIMINATION LAW  16,  1153-
58  (1976).
20.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; see also International  Bhd. of Teamsters v. United  States, 431
U.S. 324,  358 & n.44  (1977)  ("Although  the McDonnell  Douglas formula  does not require  direct
proof of discrimination, it does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his
rejection  did not  result from  the two  most common legitimate  reasons  on which an employer
might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of
a vacancy  in the job sought.  Elimination of these  reasons  for the refusal  to hire is  sufficient,
absent other explanations, to create  an inference that the decision was a discriminatory  one.").
21.  450 U.S. at 253  n.6.
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now-classic formula described in McDonnell  Douglas Corp. v. Green.22
There the Court held that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination  by showing:
(i) that  he belongs  to  a racial  minority;  (ii) that he  applied  and was
qualified for a job for which the employer  was seeking applicants; (ii)
that, despite his  qualifications,  he was rejected;  (iv) and that after his
rejection,  the position remained  open and the employer  continued  to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's  qualifications.23
According to Burdine, plaintiffs'  prima facie case establishes a "legally
mandatory,  rebuttable  presumption"  of discrimination.24  Defendant
must now produce evidence  or suffer an adverse judgment.25
The Court's description of the amount of evidence the defendant is
required to produce at the second stage of proof indicates that one of
the goals of the Burdine standard is to provide plaintiffs with the kind
of detailed  discovery  that would  make it possible  for  them to  prove
illicit intent.  Thus, admissible evidence articulating with some specific-
ity the reasons  for the employment  decision must be produced.26  The
defendant  cannot  simply rest  on conclusory  allegations  in the plead-
ings.27  Stage two is designed "to frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity  so  that the  plaintiff will have  a  full  and  fair  opportunity  to
demonstrate  pretext. '28  However, defendant  has no burden ofpersua-
sion. He need  only satisfy  a burden  of  production by providing  evi-
dence explaining the reasons for his actions.  He need not persuade the
fact-finder that the reasons are sensible or job-related, or even that they
are the real reasons for his action.2 9  The burden of persuasion  on the
issue of illicit intent is on plaintiff. 30
At the third stage, plaintiff must provide persuasive proof of illicit
intent in order to prevail.  Such proof may consist  simply of evidence
that the reasons proffered by defendant are not credible.3'  Indeed there
may be no additional presentation of evidence by plaintiff at all.  Plain-
tiff can simply rely on his prima facie case and on cross-examination  of
defendant's rebuttal witnesses.32
22.  411  U.S. 792 (1973).
23.  Id.  at 802.
24.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
25.  See F. JAMES  &  G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE  §§ 7.7,  .9  (1977).
26.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
27.  Id.  at 255  n.9.
28.  Id.  at 255-56.
29.  Id.  at 254.
30.  Id.
31.  Id.  at 254-55.
32.  Id.  at 255 n.10.
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II
THE ISSUE  PRESENTED  BY AIKENS
In Aikens  plaintiff challenged  decisions denying him promotion to
four higher level  Postal Service jobs-jobs  such  as "Mail  Processing
Officer,"  and "Director of the Operations Division."  Aikens presented
evidence to the court of his objective qualifications for the jobs, show-
ing that he satisfied all requirements, and that he compared  favorably
with the candidates selected, all of whom were white.  The promotional
decisions  at issue were made by two white supervisors,  apparently  on
the basis  of their  subjective judgment  of various  candidates'  relative
qualifications.
The district court held that Aikens failed to make out a prima facie
case because he had not proven that he was as or more qualified than
the candidates  chosen. 33  The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that in or-
der to make out a prima facie case, plaintiff need show no more than
that he possesses the minimum objective qualifications for the job, to-
gether with any other  qualifications that the defendant  reveals.34  The
court recognized that professional  and managerial positions raise par-
ticularly  difficult issues:
Most abilities of a successful manager-especially the ability to assume
responsibility for motivating and directing other employees-are intan-
gible, and each applicant could bring to the position an enormous vari-
ety of life experiences that are relevant.35
It held that proof should be made as follows:
At the prima facie  stage, . . . the plaintiff may be required  to go be-
yond a showing of minimum  qualifications to demonstrate that he pos-
sesses whatever qualifications or background  experiences the employer
has indicated  are important.  At the second  stage, the  employer  must
indicate which qualifications or background experiences formed the ba-
sis of his hiring  or promotion  decision;  then, at  the  final  stage, the
33.  Aikens v. Bolger, 23  Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.  (BNA)  1138 (Feb. 26,  1979)  (Conclusion  of
Law -#8). The district court's holding is ambiguous since this finding was made at the close of a
full trial, not at the end ofplaintifis prima facie case.  Therefore the court's conclusion #8  may be
intended  as  a  holding that once  defendant  introduces  rebuttal evidence,  plaintiff must provide
evidence that he is as or more qualified in order to satisfy his burden of persuasion on the ultimate
issue of illicit intent.  The D.C.  Circuit interpreted the decision below as warranting judgment for
the defendant on a motion for judgment after plaintiffs initial presentation of his case.  However,
the  Supreme  Court could reverse  and remand for further consideration  on the ground that the
issue  as to what  constitutes an  adequate prima facie  case is not presented  by the record in this
case.
34.  665 F.2d  1057,  1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.  1707 (1982)  (No. 81-1044).
A plaintiffwho demonstrates that he possesses the absolute minimum qualifications for a
job, therefore,  does not  necessarily  make out a prima facie  case;  if  the employer has
indicated that certain  additional  qualifications  are  necessary  or preferred,  the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he has those qualifications  as well.
35.  Id.  at  1060.
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plaintiff would have to show his superiority in those areas  in order to
prove discrimination.
36
Thus under the D.C. Circuit's standard  in Aikens, plaintiffs  must
provide in their initial case all evidence that they can acquire with rea-
sonable effort related to qualifications,  but need not make the compara-
tive showing of qualifications which could provide  a basis for finding
illicit intent until the final stage of proof, after the employer's rebuttal.
The burden of production is shifted at the second stage to the employer
to show how it actually  evaluated  qualifications.
It is worth emphasizing the difficulty of plaintiffs'  ultimate task of
proving illicit  intent on  the basis  of comparative  qualifications,  even
under the D.C. Circuit's standard.  Where the promotional process  in-
cludes elements  of subjectivity  and discretion,  plaintiff cannot  at the
final stage  of proof rely  solely on  comparative  evidence  of objective
qualifications.  He must instead show, in effect, that but for racial bias
he would have been found the most qualified candidate in terms of all
the  objective  and  subjective  factors  that  the  employer  might  have
considered.
The Government argues that plaintiff must make the comparative
showing of qualifications demonstrating that he is more qualified than
the white  candidates chosen,37 in his initial proof.  Such a  showing is
said  to  be  necessary  to  demonstrate  a probability of  intentional
discrimination.38
The question posed byAikens as to the standard by which the ade-
quacy of plaintiffs'  prima facie case should be evaluated has not been
resolved  either  by Burdine or by  any  previous  Supreme  Court  case.
Burdine focused on the second stage of proof, since the issue presented
in that case  was whether, once a prima  facie case  was made  out, de-
fendants had the burden of persuasion or simply the burden of produc-
tion.  There  is language in Burdine and other of the Supreme  Court's
disparate  treatment  cases  indicating  that plaintiffs'  prima  facie  proof
should provide  the basis for an "inference  of discrimination,"  but the
cases do not make clear exactly what is meant by inference of discrimi-
nation.39  The factual records in Burdine and the Court's earlier dispa-
rate treatment  cases  indicate  that the Court  has found  a prima facie
36.  Id.
37.  See supra note 5.
38.  See supra note 4.
39.  Burdine states that  the prima facie case must provide evidence of circumstances  which
"give  rise to an inference  of unlawful discrimination,"  450  U.S.  at 253,  but  does not say such
evidence must show  aprobability  of discrimination.  It uses the  language  of probability  only  in
quoting  from  an  earlier  decision  assessing  the  relevance  of such  evidence  ";f  otherwise  unex-
plained" Id.  at 254 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))  (emphasis
added).
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case made out on the basis of evidence  short of what  would seem re-
quired to show a probability of illicit intent.40
What does seem clear from Burdine is that it envisions a scheme of
proof that would  enable plaintiffs  to obtain  at  stage two  of the trial
important  information  related  to  their  ability  to prove  illicit  intent.
The Government's  standard would radically  change this scheme,  and
its brief indicates that this is exactly what is intended.  Thus under the
Government's  proposed standard plaintiffs must learn everything pos-
sible that is relevant to proof of intent during  discovery or other pre-
trial investigation.  They cannot  rely  on the trial process  to force  de-
fendants to come forward with essential information.  The Government
argues that plaintiffs can obtain all information needed to prove illicit
intent prior to trial.  It claims that discovery  can be made effective  by
imposing sanctions at trial on recalcitrant defendants:
Moreover, while the question is not presented here, we suggest that, at
least in some circumstances an employer's unjustified failure to provide
a reason  for  his action,  when asked to  do  so  during discovery  or an
administrative investigation, may itself complete the prima facie case of
a qualified minority  applicant.4'
The question  of whether the  Government's proposal is practicable  or
otherwise appropriate  is discussed in the next Part.
40.  Thus in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411  U.S. 792 (1973),  the Supreme  Court found
that plaintiff made out a prima facie case by showing that he satisfied the objective qualifications
for the position.  The  obvious non-discriminatory  reason for defendant's  refusal  to hire  in that
case was  plaintifis prior illegal conduct, directed against that very employer,  for which plaintiff
had previously been discharged.  Nonetheless the Court held that evidence  relating to that reason
was to be introduced in the first instance  by the defendant.  Id  at 802-04.  In Burdine the Court
held  that the  plaintiff made out  a prima  facie  case  in  a situation  not very  different  from  that
presented inAikens. Plaintiff was applying for a "project director" position for a division that was
in trouble  and threatened  with termination.  The employer  failed to select her  and, six  months
later, selected another candidate, relying on an "evaluation  of the relative  qualifications"  of the
candidates.  The  Court found  that plaintiff had satisfied  her initial burden by showing  that she
was "qualified,"  leaving  it to the employer to provide evidence  as to the comparative  qualifica-
tions. 450 U.S. at 254 n.6.  In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567  (1978), the Court held
that plaintiffs  made  out a prima fade case based  on a showing of objective qualifications,  even
though  the most obvious reason  for their not being hired was that they had applied  at the gate,
and  the  employer's  selection  system  did  not allow  for consideration  of at-the-gate  applicants,
whether  white  or black.  The Court placed  the  burden on the  employer  to introduce  evidence
related to the way in which its selection system operated, and the reasons for using that system.
Indeed, it would be a rare case in which a prima facie case that satisfied the classic McDonnell
Douglas formula would provide sufficient basis to persuade a factfinder of intentional discrimina-
tion.  That formula requires plaintiff to show simply that he satisfies objective job requirements,
and was rejected for a job the employer was seeking to  fill.  As the amicus brief filed by the AFL-
CIO in support of the Government's position in Aikens points out, such evidence would lead to an
inference  of intentional discrimination only if the selection criteria were rigid  and mechanically
applied,  with selection  automatic  once  the criteria  were met.  As the brief notes,  "that type  of
selection process is rare  in our economy."  Brief for Petitioner by AFL-CIO  as Amicus  Curiae at
13, Aikens.
41.  Brief for Petitioner at 29, Aikens.CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
III
LEGITIMACY  OF  THE AIKENS  STANDARD
The Government's  argument  rests on matters related to principle
and policy.  As a matter of principle allegedly rooted in precedent,  the
argument is that the prima facie  case should consist of evidence war-
ranting a finding of intentional discrimination, because that is the ulti-
mate  issue  in the  case.  As  a matter  of policy,  employers  should be
protected  from the burden of having to produce  evidence  in court  in
cases in which plaintiffs show no more than that they are among what
may be  a large  group of candidates,  all  of whom  are qualified  for  a
given job.
A.  Principle  and  Precedent
There  is  in  fact  nothing  strange  or  anomalous  about  allowing
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case  on the basis of evidence  that
stops short of demonstrating  a probability of the ultimate fact at issue.
Courts have regularly created presumptions where they seemed appro-
priate in  order  to further the  goals  of the  substantive  legal norm  at
issue.  A presumption, by definition, requires that certain facts be pre-
sumed  to  be true, regardless  of whether  a  factfinder would  likely  or
could  properly  find  them  to  be  true  on  the  basis  of the  evidence
presented.  Thus presumptions are said to have been  created in essen-
tially two situations:  (1) where B (the fact to be presumed) would be a
permissible  inference  from  A  (the  evidence  triggering  the  presump-
tion), but not the only one;  and (2) where B would not even be a per-
missible inference from A.42  Presumptions  are often created in part in
order to shift the burden of production  to the party that has the rele-
42.  F.  JAMES  & G.  HAZARD,  supra note 25,  § 7.9, at 255.  See also id. § 7.9, at 260  ("the
fact(s), A, which give rise to a presumption of B in many instances are not sufficient to warrant an
inference of B.").
Any previous doubt as to the  constitutionality of presumptions  in the civil context  seems to
have been resolved, regardless of the strength  of the relationship between the evidence  triggering
the presumption and the fact to be presumed.  Thus  legislative history  of rule 301  of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which governs presumptions in civil cases, makes clear that the rule is based on
the premise that such presumptions pose no constitutional problems, even if the basic fact has no
probative value  as evidence  of the presumed  fact.  See  1 J. WEINSTEIN  & M.  BEROER,  w  EIN-
STEIN'S  EVIDENCE  1 301[01],  at  301-24  (1982).  The relevant  constitutional  question is  simply
whether the presumption serves a rational purpose.  See generally Note, Constltutlonally  of  Rebut-
table  Statutory Presumptions,  55  COLUM. L. REV.  527, 541  (1955)  ("If,  on the balancing of conve-
niences, it is fair to compel  the defendant to come forward and he fails to do  so, the judge may
give judgment  against him.  But  this judgment is  not  a declaration  by  the  court  that  the  facts
necessary  for liability have been  established.  No evidentiary  or inferential process  is involved,
and rational connection  is irrelevant.  Rather, defendant has defaulted  in his obligation  and the
court may impose liability as a penalty for the default.").
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vant evidence peculiarly within his control.43
In title VII disparate impact cases,'  the courts have long and con-
sistently held that plaintiffs  can make  out a prima  facie  case without
showing a probability of the ultimate fact at issue.  Thus plaintiffs' ini-
tial case may consist solely of evidence that an employer's policies have
an adverse impact on minorities, despite the fact that the ultimate issue
in.  a disparate impact case is whether there is an unjustfled impact-an
impact that is not job related.  Once plaintiffs show impact, the burden
is  shifted  to the  employer to  prove job-relatedness. 45  The  employer
would suffer an adverse judgment on the merits if it produced no rebut-
tal evidence, even though there is nothing necessarily  unlawful about
maintaining policies that have a disparate impact.
Courts  have  similarly  shifted  burdens  of proof when  doing  so
seemed appropriate in order to enforce the federal  Constitution's ban
on intentional discrimination,46 just as it has shifted burdens to enforce
substantive  law norms  embodied in legislation governing civil rights47
and economic regulation,48 and in the common  law of contract49 and
43.  See F. JAMEs  & G. HAZARD, supra note 25,  § 7.9, at 257 (access to evidence as basis for
presumption of bailee's negligence when  goods are damaged while in bailee's possession).
Access to  evidence  is  one of the key considerations  determining  who bears  the burden  of
proof in  general.  See  9 J.  WIGMORE,  EVIDENCE  § 2486,  at  290  (Chadbourne  ed.  1981);  E.
CLEARY, McCoRMIcK's  HANDBOOK OF THE LAW  OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (2d ed. 1972);  Inter-
national Harvester  Co. v. Ruckelshaus,  478 F.2d 615, 643  (D.C. Cir.  1973); United States v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R.,  355  U.S.  253, 256 n.5 (1957).
Burdine adopted a particular type of presumption known generally as the "bursting bubble"
presumption, which shifts the burden of production, but not the burden of persuasion.  When the
party against whom the presumption  operates produces  the requisite  information, the presump-
tion is said to disappear.  Bursting  bubble presumptions were established as the federal norm by
rule 301  of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Such presumptions have been said to operate essen-
tially  as discovery  devices.  1 J. WEINSTEIN  &  M.  BERGER, supra note  42,  at 301-11  (quoting
unpublished memorandum from E. Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence).
44.  See supra notes 9-14  and accompanying  text.
45.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401  U.S. at 432,  433 n.9.  In disparate  impact cases  the de-
fendant  has the burden of persuasion, as well as production,  on the issue of job-relatedness.  Id.
46.  See, eg.,  Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977)  (showing of substantial under-
representation of Mexican-Americans  called to serve as grand jurors makes out prima facie case of
discriminatory  purpose, shifting burden of proof to state); Alexander v. Louisiana,  405 U.S. 625,
631-32 (1972)  (same, except blacks underrepresented);  Keyes v. School Dist. No.  1,  413 U.S.  189,
208-10  (1973)  (finding of intentional segregation in one part of school system creates a presump-
tion  of intentional  segregation  in other parts  of system, shifting  burden of proof to defendant
school board);  cf.  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg  Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971)  (ability to
classify school  as "white  school"  or "Negro  school"  constitutes prima facie case  of violation  of
equal protection clause).
47.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749,  753  (W.D.  La.  1963)  (under Civil
Rights Act of 1960,  statistical evidence  created presumption of discrimination shifting burden  of
proof to defendants  to show that blacks were not qualified for voter registration).
48.  See,  -g.,  United  States  v.  Aluminum  Co. of America,  148  F.2d 416,  444-45  (2d Cir.
1945)  (Hand,  J.) (under  the Sherman  Act, once government  showed that cartel intended  to de-
crease imports, it was the cartels burden to demonstrate that the market had been unaffected,  in
part because "they to whom the facts were more accessible  than to plaintiff ought to prove  it");CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
tort.5°  Defendants' superior access to the relevant evidence is usually a
major reason for shifting the burden in these cases.  The courts ordina-
rily  do not indicate  exactly  what  level  of probability  plaintiffs  must
show with respect to the particular fact at issue in order to justify shift-
ing the burden of proof. But it is clear that there is no general principle
requiring that plaintiffs show that the existence of the fact is more likely
than  not,  or  indeed  that  plaintiffs  show  any  other  specific  level  of
probability.  Probability is simply one of a number of factors  used by
the courts in determining which party should bear the burden of proof
on particular issues.
There is, therefore, ample precedent  for the principle represented
by the D.C. Circuit's standard inAikens.  The real issue is whether the
standard serves a useful purpose in furthering the substantive goals of
title VII.
B  Policy and  Practicalities
There  has,  of course,  been  extensive  debate  in various  contexts
about what Congress'  goals were in enacting title VII.  Battles are cur-
rently being waged over whether the disparate impact doctrine  is con-
sistent  with those  goals,  and  over whether  the Act  was  designed  to
permit or to prohibit affirmative  action for blacks.  But there has never
been any question as to the fact that one of the central goals of title VII
is the elimination of intentional discrimination.  The Aikens  standard
should be  assessed  in terms  of whether it would further this  goal by
helping courts to  determine  fairly  and accurately  whether intentional
discrimination has entered into an employer's decision-making process.
Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1947)  (under the Emergency Price  Control Act,
once  government made  a prima facie case that  defendant's prices exceeded  statutory maxima,  it
was defendant's burden to show justification, because of the general rule placing burden of proof
on party  with special knowledge of the relevant  facts).
49.  See, eg.,  Erving Paper  Mills  v. Hudson-Sharp  Mach.  Co.,  332 F.2d  674,  677-78  (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.  946  (1964).
50.  See, e.g.,  Jaffe, Res lpsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO  L. REv.  1, 6 (1951),  discussing
the doctrine  of res ipsa  loquitur in terms which are quite relevant  to the issue  in Aikens:
What justification  can there be for putting  to a jury a case in which a  "rational"
finding of liability cannot be made?  The reason is two-fold.  Our experience  and under-
standing of such situations indicates a substantial, if indeterminate, probability of negli-
gence.  In short, there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff may have a cause of
action.  Now  ordinarily  that fact  alone would  not warrant  a judgment  against the  de-
fendant.  But typically, if not invariably,  in this  class of case the  defendant has greater
access to the facts than the plaintiff. This is the significance of the usual requirement for
res ipsa that the defendant be in "control" of the mischief-working instrumentality.  Res
ipsa  loquitur rests on the notion that it is fair to treat the probability as the  fact if the
defendant has the power to rebut the inference.
See also 9 J. WIGMORE,  supra-note  43,  § 2509, at 507 ("the particular force and justice of the rule
Ires ipsa loquitur],  regarded as a presumption  throwing upon the party charged the  duty of pro-
ducing  evidence, consists  in the circumstances that  the chief evidence  of the true  cause, whether
culpable  or innocent, is practically  accessible to him but inaccessible  to the injured person.").
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1.  Relationship Between the Prima  Facie Case and the Presumption  of
Discrimination
The strength of the relationship between the evidence on which a
presumption is based, and the ultimate fact to be presumed, is one indi-
cator of the fairness  and utility of that presumption.  If there  is very
little connection between the two, there would seem to be an increased
risk that defendants will be dragged into court for no adequate reason,
and even that the ultimate facts found will be erroneous.  On the other
hand, where a presumption is based  on evidence which indicates that
the fact to be presumed is reasonably likely, there would seem to be few
risks in using a mandatory presumption to force defendants to produce
evidence.
Under  the Aikens  standard,  as formulated  by  the  D.C.  Circuit,
there is a substantial relationship between the underlying evidence and
the discrimination to be  presumed.  Thus  to make  out a prima  facie
case the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiff had to show that he satisfied all
known  qualifications,  including  any discretionary  qualifications  that
the employer revealed.  Plaintiff was to be required on remand to show
that he was not passed over because of an "absolute or relative lack of
qualifications.""1  The  evidence  revealed  that  white  supervisors  had
made the  promotional decisions  at  issue pursuant  to a  discretionary
system,  with the  result  that four  whites  were  chosen  over  the  black
plaintiff for the positions at issue.  It does not require  a great logical
leap to presume intentional discrimination  under these circumstances.
Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against a
background  of pervasive intentional  discrimination.  While much has
changed  over the last two  decades, there  can be little doubt that dis-
criminatory  attitudes  are  still  common.  And  discretionary  selection
systems,  relying  on the subjective judgment of white  decisionmakers,
have long been deemed suspect by the courts because of their potential
for masking and implementing bias-both conscious  and unconscious.
Indeed such systems have generally been held violative of title VII on
these grounds,  at least where  they have resulted  in adverse racial im-
pact. 5"  Accordingly, whether or not plaintiff's prima facie proof inAik-
ens  demonstrated  a  probability  of  intentional  discrimination,  it
certainly demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of such  discrimination.
Moreover,  rebuttable  presumptions  mandate  that  the  presumed
fact be accepted  and judgment  directed against the defendant, only af-
ter the defendant  refuses to  come forward  with information.  In the
Aikens situation it is the employer who is in the best position to explain
51.  665 F.2d at  1060.
52.  The  leading case is Rowe  v. General Motors  Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.  1972).
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how its promotional system operated, and why white candidates were
preferred over the qualified black.  As indicated below in Subsection 2,
courts have generally felt that it is appropriate  to place the burden of
producing  evidence on the party in control of that evidence.  It is  en-
tirely reasonable  to conclude that the employer is guilty of intentional
discrimination if, in the face of a rule requiring that it come forward
with an explanation of the nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, no
such explanation is produced.
The Aikens  presumption  bears  a  striking  similarity  to  Supreme
Court  doctrine developed  in the jury discrimination  cases,  where  the
ultimate issue is whether state officials are guilty of intentional discrim-
ination, in violation of the federal  Constitution.  There the Court has
held that a "presumption"  of discrimination is created where plaintiffs
produce  evidence of: (1) a statistical disparity between the percentage
of blacks in the relevant population and their percentage of jurors se-
lected, together with (2) the existence of a subjective  system for select-
ing jurors.53  The rationale  for these decisions  has included the notion
that subjective  systems lend themselves to abuse, together with the fact
that defendant is in the best position to produce evidence as to the rea-
sons for the exclusion  of disproportionate numbers of blacks.
2.  Relationship of the Presumption to the Production of  Relevant
Information
a.  Access to Information
Presumptions are often created, in part, to further the discovery of
vital information by putting the burden of production on the party with
primary access to that information.54  The presumption  created by the
D.C. Circuit in Aikens  is well-designed  to further the  goal of getting
before the court evidence  that is essential to an understanding  of how
the employment  decision at issue was made, and whether illicit intent
played some part in it.
Thus under theAikens standard, once plaintiffs have presented ev-
idence  that they  satisfy  all known  qualifications,  defendants  are  re-
quired  to  produce  evidence  as  to  how  they  actually  evaluated
qualifications.  Placing  the burden of production  on the  employer  to
explain how it assesses  qualifications makes sense because the manner
53.  See, eg.,  Castaneda v. Partida,  430  U.S.  482,  494 (1977)  (selection  procedure  that is
"susceptible of abuse" supports presumption of discrimination raised by statistical showing); Tur-
ner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.  346,  360 (1970)  (grand jury selection procedure  that involves subjective
judgment  rather  than  objective  criteria  supports  similar  presumption  raised  by  statistical
showing).
54.  See supra note 43.
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in  which  a  discretionary  selection  system  operates  is  information
uniquely within the employer's  control.  Such systems tend to operate
in unknown and unforeseeable ways.  Relatively few have been formal-
ized  and systematized.  When  discretion  is built into an  employment
system,  decisionmakers  are ordinarily  given broad leeway to assess  a
variety of subjective and objective factors they may deem relevant.  In-
deed  the Government  admits  in  its Aikens  brief that  often  even  the
employer will not know how a particular discretionary decisionmaking
process  operates  to  determine  who is  most qualified  until the  actual
selection decision is made.'  If plaintiffs cannot find out how a given
discretionary  system operates,  they cannot make out a case that they
are more qualified under that system than other candidates. 6
b.  Discovery of Information
Arguments  have  been made  that presumptions  are  unneccessary
for discovery purposes, given the development of the modem discovery
system.  The  Government  brief in Aikens  relies  on such  arguments,
stating that plaintiffs  can find  out everything  in  discovery  that  they
could  find out from the defendant's rebuttal at trial.57
There is obvious appeal to the idea of forcing plaintiffs to find out
everything  possible relevant to their claim prior to trial, and then dis-
missing cases at the close of plaintitffs initial proof where there is insuf-
ficient  evidence  to  sustain  a  claim  of  intentional  discrimination.
Defendants would be protected from the burden of putting  on elabo-
rate  defenses  to frivolous  cases,  and courts would  be protected  from
having to sit through such defenses.
However, the value of presumptions in cases like.Aikens cannot be
so easily cast aside.  The availability of discovery prior to trial is simply
not a  complete and  adequate  substitute  for the presumption  at trial.
The Government's  argument  flies in the face of the realities  of litiga-
55.  "An employer might realize that a particular quality or attribute would be desirable for
the position he is filling only when he sees that quality in an applicant."  Brief for Petitioner  at 24
n.18, Aikens.
56.  Justice Marshall  argued  when  the Aikens  case  was  previously before  the  Court  that
plaintiffs'  difficulties  in finding  out how such  systems operate justified  imposing the burden of
production on the employer.
An applicant who has  satisfied the objective  qualifications  established by the employer
for promotion  may have  no way  of knowing  what  additional considerations  the  em-
ployer relied on in selecting a particular  person among the pool of qualified applicants.
This information is  uniquely within the control of the employer, and thus it places  an
unfair burden  on the plaintiff to require him, as part of his prima facie case,  to guess
what additional considerations the employer might have relied on and to prove that even
under these considerations  he was at least as qualified as the selected applicant.
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 453 U.S.  902, 906 n.2  (1981)  (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
57.  Brief for Petitioner at 31,.Aikens.
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tion.  The simple truth is that in the absence of the Aikens presump-
tion,  it will often be  impossible for plaintiffs  to  provide at the prima
facie stage the kind of comparative evaluation of candidates demanded
by the  Government's  standard.  This is because  first, the  defendant's
incentives to produce information in pre-trial discovery  will likely be
quite different from the incentives  operating at trial, and second, the
existence  of the presumption at trial affects the  dynamics of both the
discovery process and the trial.
i  Incentives to Produce Information.  Under  the  Government's
proposed  standard,  the  defendant  would  have  little  incentive  to  be
forthcoming  with information in pre-trial  discovery.  Burdine tells the
employer that his ultimate burden is simply to articulate a non-discrim-
inatory reason for his action.  Defense counsel are likely to feel that this
can be used  to justify some very conclusory  statements in response  to
discovery requests regarding the nature of the employer's selection sys-
tem, and the reasons white candidates were chosen over blacks.  In the-
ory, of course,  the  scope of discovery  goes far beyond  evidence that
would be necessary or admissible at trial.  However, defendants are not
likely  to be  punished for  evasive  answers;  or for vague  and general
answers;  or  for  refusals  to  respond  that  are  coupled  with colorable
claims that the requests call for information that is unnecessary, or that
would be  unduly burdensome  to produce,  or  that is privileged." 8  In
order  to force  information  from  a reluctant defendant,  plaintiffs will
have to seek court orders to compel discovery, based on a showing as to
why the particular information at issue is important.
Only plaintiffs with access to significant  resources  will be  able to
take full advantage  of the discovery process.  Depositions, motions to
compel,  and motions  to  impose sanctions  are all expensive.  Costs  of
such  discovery, including  costs  for attorneys'  fees,  will  ordinarily  be
recoverable only if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the merits.59
Moreover, courts  are unlikely  to impose  any sanction  unless  de-
fendants are guilty of deliberately flouting obviously reasonable discov-
ery requests, or of disobeying a direct and specific court order. And the
kind of sanction that the government  suggests  as a possibility-a find-
ing that  plaintiff has met  his prima  facie  case  as  discussed  above  at
page 1209-is extremely  rare.
58.  Defendants often successfully resist requests for discovery related to comparative qualifi-
cations on privacy and other grounds.  See, e.g.,  Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581
(4th Cir.), cert.  denied,  434 U.S. 904 (1977)  (upholding district court refusal to compel discovery of
confidential  evaluations  of faculty  members);  McKillop  v.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,  386 F.
Supp. 1270,  1277 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (district court refusal to compel discovery based on state statu-
tory "official information"  privilege).
59.  Title VII provides  that the "prevailing  party" may recover  reasonable  attorneys'  fees.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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The Government's  standard would, moreover, provide defendants
with a  strong incentive  to resist  discovery, because  if plaintiffs  were
unable to  find out enough  during discovery to make out a persuasive
case of intentional  discrimination  during their intitial presentation  of
proof,  they  would  lose  without  defendants  ever  having  to  present
evidence.
The reality is, therefore, that plaintiffs would be denied the infor-
mation essential to a prima facie case in many cases, and that in other
cases they would obtain it only at the cost of wasteful discovery battles.
The Aikens presumption puts defendants in a very different posi-
tion with respect to disclosing vital evidence.  If they fail to come for-
ward at trial with evidence that the judge considers  adequate to satisfy
their burden of production, they will suffer an adverse judgment on the
merits.  Moreover, while under Burdine defendants have no obligation
to show that their articulated reasons are real or reasonable, and while
technically the burden of persuasion will be on plaintiffs to prove illicit
motive, defendants are likely to fear that if they introduce only the bare
minimum of evidence required by Burdine, the factflnder is more likely
to be persuaded by plaintiff's  showing of intent.  Defendants are thus
likely to  introduce  evidence  in some  detail  as to how their selection
systems  operate  and  how candidates'  qualifications  are  evaluated,  in
order to show their good  faith.  It is this kind  of detail that Burdine
indicated may be necessary if plaintiffs are to prove such illicit intent as
may exist.
Justice  Powell, writing for a unanimous  Court in Burdine, seems
consciously  to have considered  these kinds of litigation practicalities.
He  specifically  recognized  that  the  pressures  of the  litigation  situa-
tion-defendants' fear of losing-provide a useful incentive for defend-
ants to produce meaningful, detailed information.60
60.  In finding that plaintiff can expect a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation, afford-
ing it an adequate  opportunity  to demonstrate  defendant's illicit intent, Justice  Powell states:
[A]lthough  the defendant  does not bear a formal burden  of persuasion,  the defendant
nevertheless  retains an incentive to persuade  the trier of fact that the employment  deci-
sion was lawful.  Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for
its explanation.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. The Goyernment also recognizes  these litigation practicalities.  It notes
that at trial the defendant  will have an incentive  to "introduce evidence  that the plaintiff in fact
had the shortcoming assigned as the reason for his rejection; that the successful candidate did not
have that shortcoming  or was otherwise better qualified; or  that its practices  generally  show no
sign of discrimination."  Brief for Petitioner at 32 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. at 804-05).  The  Government  urges that employers  should not  be subject to the burden of
having  to  make  such  a  showing.  But  it would  also  be  a burden  for the employer  to  provide
plaintiffs  with comparable  information at discovery.  It seems clear that what the  Government
seeks is a standard that would free the employer from  ever having to provide  such information,
whether at discovery  or at trial, and free courts from ever having to assess complex analyses of
comparative  qualifications,  whether  upon  plaintiffs  initial  case  or  upon defendant's  rebuttal.
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The Aikens presumption thus operates as an alternative to discov-
ery which may be necessary in a variety of situations due to limitations
on plaintiffs' resources, the refusal of defendants to cooperate with  dis-
covery, and traditional judicial reluctance to enforce  discovery obliga-
tions with effective  sanctions.
i  Dynamics of  the Discovery and Trial  Process. In addition, the
Aikens presumption  should affect the  dynamics  of the discovery  pro-
cess in such a way as to enable plaintiffs to learn what they need to with
relative efficiency.  This is because the presumption means that defend-
ants will have to be prepared to put on evidence  at trial as to the rea-
sons  for  their  selection  decisions,  and  the  manner  in  which  their
selection procedures  work.  This in turn means that in discovery plain-
tiffs will be able to focus in on defendants' prospective proof, and make
pointed inquiries  into what  that proof will  consist of, what  witnesses
defendants  expect to rely on, and the like.
By  contrast, under the Government's  standard,  even if plaintiffs
were able to obtain in pre-trial discovery  all needed information, dis-
covery requests would have to be extraordinarily wide-ranging.  Proof
at trial would be similarly complicated.  Given all the ways in which  a
particular discretionary  system  might measure  various  subjective  and
objective factors, plaintiffs' counsel would have to explore in discovery
and present  at trial extensive  evidence  in an attempt to eliminate  all
possible  rational  explanations  for  why their  clients  might have  been
found less qualified than those selected.  Plaintiffs'  counsel would want
access to all candidates' personnel  files, and would want to examine in
detail the various ways in which qualifications  might have  been mea-
sured by  the employer.  Under the Aikens  standard, plaintiffs  might
seek much of the same information, but they would not be required to,
and they would not have to present  an elaborate  case  of comparative
qualifications  based on a number  of different  hypothetical  evaluative
systems,  in order to survive a defendant's motion for judgment at the
close  of plaintiff's case.  Unlike plaintiff, defendant  should know how
its selection system operated in any particular case, and should be able
to present that simply and efficiently  at the rebuttal stage.
The Aikens  standard  would  do  nothing  to  discourage  plaintiffs
from pursuing discovery.  Plaintiffs'  counsel have a strong incentive  to
find out all they can in discovery,  regardless of what the formal stan-
dard at the prima facie proof stage is.  They will usually want to make
the most persuasive  case they can in their initial presentation of proof,
Thus, the Government notes the difficulties of assessing comparative  qualifications in cases where
many kinds of criteria and many different subjective judgments  may be considered  relevant.  It
argues that "the only way to avoidsuch inquiries  is a dismissal of the complaint..,  on the ground
that plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case."  Brief for Petitioner at 34 (emphasis added).
[Vol.  70:1201 1218PR  0 OF OF  DISCRIMINA TOR Y INTENT
to avoid any risk of dismissal; and they will be in a far better position to
deal with defendant's  rebuttal evidence if they know what  to expect.
The Aikens standard  would  simply  operate  to make  discovery  more
efficient  and effective,  and to provide  an alternative  means of forcing
the production of relevant evidence  for those situations  in which the
discovery process has failed.  And it should operate to expedite presen-
tation of proof at trial.
Finally, the Aikens standard serves  some functions that discovery
cannot serve.  It forces the employer to the stand to make an account-
ing of some sort to the factfinder.  This may be far more revealing than
would be the disjointed story told by hostile employer witnesses called
by plaintiff as a result of what he learned in formal discovery.61
Elimination of the Aikens presumption is not necessary to free de-
fendants  and the courts from the burden of frivolous  suits.  Burdine's
substantive  standard  makes  it  extremely  difficult  for  plaintiffs  ulti-
mately to win any case in which the employer relies on a discretionary
selection  system  involving  elements  of subjective  judgment.  Such  a
system, by its very nature, has a great deal of pliability.  Employers can
with relative  ease  come  up  with non-discriminatory  explanations  for
their selection decisions.  These explanations will not likely look so out-
rageous as to enable plaintiffs to persuade the factfinder that the expla-
nations are  mere pretexts,  shielding  intentional discrimination.  Since
plaintiffs  will prevail  only in cases  where they are able to prove  that
defendants'  explanations  are  not  credible,  or to  find  the  proverbial
smoking gun, they would be foolish to pursue cases in which they have
no good reason to believe that such evidence will be available.  Unless
plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the merits, they cannot recover the costs
of bringing suit.6"  If the claims  are found to be frivolous,  costs-in-
cluding attorneys' fees-may be assessed against  plaintiffs.63  There are
thus  strong  financial  disincentives  against  bringing  non-meritorious
claims to court.
CONCLUSION
The Government argues in its Aikens brief that its proposed stan-
dard should be adopted because otherwise the disparate treatment doc-
trine  would  impose  excessive  burdens  on  employers  to  defend  their
61.  See Jaffe, supra note 50, at 13-14 (arguing that discovery procedures  have not made the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine obsolete, because  "being able to ask an opponent questions, albeit with-
out risk, is inferior to the right to compel him to make on his own initiative a full accounting").
62.  See supra note 59.
63.  Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,421  (1978)  ("A district court may in
its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that
the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation even though not brought
in subjective bad faith.").
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practices  in court.'  However,  the  Supreme  Court just recently  pro-
vided significant protections for employers when it held in Burdine that
they had  no burden of persuasion  in a  disparate  treatment  case but,
instead,  had  simply  to  produce  a  nondiscriminatory  explanation  for
such treatment.  Moreover, as indicated above, the disparate treatment
doctrine  as defined by Aikens  poses a  relatively limited burden  on or
threat to employers in the context of discretionary, subjective decision-
making on the managerial  level.
The disparate treatment doctrine does, nonetheless, remain impor-
tant. It may be the only available route to challenging complex employ-
ment systems that rely on discretion and subjective judgment, since it is
not clear  that courts  will apply the disparate impact doctrine  to such
systems.  And  if there  is a general  cutback  on the  impact  doctrine's
applicability, the disparate treatment  doctrine  may come increasingly
to  define the meaning of title VII.
Moreover, the disparate treatment  challenge  is often an essential
step in discovering  how the employer's  system  operates.  Thus, in re-
buttal  to the disparate treatment  challenge,  the employer  may reveal
for the first time what kinds of objective  criteria  and subjective judg-
ments  it  relies  on  in  making  employment  decisions.  This  discovery
provides  plaintiffs  with  at least the possibility  of asking  the  court  to
consider further, more specific  challenges to particular practices or cri-
teria under either the impact or the treatment doctrine.6 5
A crucial aspect of the courts' interpretation of title VII to date has
been the insistence that employers  and their representatives  come into
court to defend themselves.  It has been  through this process  that the
courts have learned what various  employment systems look like.  This
understanding  has  enabled  the courts  to develop  and refine  title  VII
jurisprudence  to deal with  the problems  perceived.66  Burdine recog-
nized the importance of this tradition in holding that employers would
at least be required to produce relevant information at trial.  The dan-
ger of the Government's position in Aikens is that, by encouraging  dis-
missal at the close of plaintiffs' initial  presentation of evidence, it would
deprive courts of information vital to their understanding of challenged
employment systems, and to the continuing development  of appropri-
ate title VII law.
64.  Brief for Petitioner at  11.
65.  Bartholet, supra note 8, at  1006.
66.  Id.  at 990-98.
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